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All British eyes by now were focussed on Dunkirk. The great evacuation was reaching its peak. Completely contrary to expectations 30 to 40 thousand troops a day were being taken off. However, the waiting men, standing in long queues on the beaches, were having a very trying time. There can be few worse experiences than standing in disciplined lines for hours on end while being bombed.

Unhappily, whilst the RAF was flying hundreds of missions – in total 2,739 fighter sorties were flown over Dunkirk – their impact was little felt by the troops on the beaches. Dowding’s determination not to send more fighters to France, coupled with the fact that Dunkirk was at the maximum range for single-engine fighters, meant that, despite the hard work and bravery of the pilots, the patrols were relatively ineffective. However, the evacuation was able to transport just under 340,000 troops back to Britain. Just over 68,000 were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner by ground forces during the evacuation from France.

Still, the RAF pilots who were shot down over the beaches didn’t have much of an experience either. Alan Deere, whose Spitfire had taken a burst of enemy fire in its engine, managed to put his aircraft down in shallow water. He managed to get out and, eventually, to get to the beach. When he finally got on a craft, he was greeted by the Major in charge, with the remark ‘for all the good you’ve done you really needn’t have come’. There it was. In the end, most of them got away and that’s what counted.

The events of May and early June impacted heavily on Fighter Command’s strength with the loss of around 500 of their aircraft. The losses were such that Dowding told the War Cabinet on 2nd June that he could not guarantee air superiority for more that 48 hours.

France was in its death agonies. The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, had been dismissed. General Maxime Weygand, fresh from Syria, had been appointed in his place. Meanwhile, nothing could stop the pell-mell advance of the Wehrmacht. The RAF Advanced Air Striking Force, consisting mainly of Fairey Battles, along with a number of Blenheims, had been decimated as they were committed to the bombing of bridges which the retreating armies had failed to blow up. Several squadrons of Hurricanes were operating as cover for the BEF, and had been holding their own in the air, but so continuously that their losses too were now very serious.

Still, the BEF was managing to retreat along with substantial French forces to Dunkirk. On 24th May, the evacuation from France began with 1,000 men being picked up at Boulogne. That same day, the British Government began planning the evacuation from Dunkirk. The early estimates were that we would be unlikely to get more than 30 to 40 thousand troops safely away. This, out of a total of over 300,000 troops in all. By the evening of 26th May, the order for Operation Dynamo to commence had been given, and on 27th May, the first evacuation from Dunkirk took place. The following day, the Belgian army surrendered.

The next few days of May, the second week of Churchill’s premiership, were to put the new leader under severe strain.  Would the circumstances arise under which the British Government would have to seek terms from Hitler?  There were, undoubtedly, waverers who thought that if the situation deteriorated further, we would be forced to seek terms. But Churchill was absolutely firm and determined.  In his view, there should be no parley, no negotiations.  But if Britain was attacked following the fall of France, Churchill would have to rely on the preparations to repel such an attack which had already been made, and made, furthermore, under his predecessor, Chamberlain.  The problem here was that for the previous five years, Churchill had personally led a campaign in the House of Commons against, first, Stanley Baldwin’s Government, then the Chamberlain Government, for what he considered to be their alleged failure to take Hitler seriously.

In particular, he was critical of the failure of the Government to modernise the Royal Air Force, bearing in mind the huge advances which appeared to be taking place in the development of the Luftwaffe.  In response to the widely held fear of bombing, which was so starkly voiced by Baldwin when he declared in 1932 that ‘the bomber will always get through’, development of the RAF had initially focussed on Bomber Command.

Another major contribution to Britain’s defences that began under the Chamberlain Government, was the development of radar [the story of which will be told later]. Churchill had had his own adviser on these matters, a certain Professor Lindemann, who had suddenly become the scientific adviser to the new Government, at least in all but name.  Could he, Churchill, or his adviser Lindemann, have any confidence in what had been done, particularly, by the Chamberlain Government?  Interestingly enough, the question never arose.  It was in any case too late to ask.  There was every chance that within a week or so the German onslaught on Britain would begin.  Churchill just had to hope that what had been built over the past five years was going to withstand such a test. It either would, in which case, the country would be safe.  Or it wouldn’t, in which case, Churchill would soon be gone and we’d have a government led by such a figure as Lord Halifax, who would have to do the negotiations with Hitler.  It was as stark as that.

Meanwhile, Dowding would have to try and avoid suffering too serious a diminution in the strength of Fighter Command.  Following a meeting, on 19 May, between Dowding, Churchill and the Head of Bomber Command, to discuss air support in the increasingly likely case of the evacuation of the BEF from France, it was decided no more squadrons would be sent to France.  Extra air support would be provided from bases in Britain.

Welcome to the first post of the Battle of Britain Blog. For the next nine weeks updates will be weekly. The daily blog will begin on July 10th, the start of the Battle of Britain.

May 10th 1940 was the day the real war started and the Phoney War ended.  It was today that Hitler’s armoured divisions launched their Blitzkrieg attack in the West, that in a matter of days would break through at Sedan and successfully cross the River Meuse.  The same day, in the United Kingdom, Neville Chamberlain resigned as Prime Minister and was succeeded by Winston Churchill and a new Coalition Government.  (70 years on, spookily, something similar may be happening!) For Britain, these events brought about a complete change of attitude to the War.

Events were to move fast.  Within a week, Hitler’s Panzer divisions were streaking for the Channel coast.  However, there were many, in England, who still thought France would survive this attack, as she had survived in the First World War.  Churchill, a strong admirer of the French Army, very much held this view.  Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the head of Fighter Command, was for his part aware that the new Prime Minister had every faith in the French.  Dowding’s worry was that they would soon be asking for support, in particular in the air.  He could foresee that sending such reinforcements to France would be a worrying temptation.  There were, after all, dozens of squadrons of fighters sitting idly on airfields in England.

The trouble was that Britain had another strategy up its sleeve.  Since he had been appointed leader of the new Fighter Command back in 1936, Dowding had seen his job as safeguarding the British homeland.  He had built up his fighter force for this purpose, not to send it to France.  As he saw it, he was in charge of the country’s ultimate insurance policy.  He had no intention of losing it in a failed campaign in France.  Moreover, the whole idea of sending the British Expeditionary Force to France had only been decided in the previous spring, as a gesture of solidarity with our Allies.  When war had seemed inevitable, Dowding’s view was that we wished them luck, but he still had to keep his powder dry for the ultimate test when it came.  The way the campaign in France was shaping, it looked increasingly likely that come it would.

The French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, and General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, unsurprisingly, requested that extra RAF fighter squadrons be sent to France.  On May 15th, Churchill asked for Dowding’s views.  Dowding urged the War Cabinet not to send any more aircraft; it was imperative that they were available for the defence of Britain.  He set out his views, in no uncertain terms, in the now famous 10 Point Memorandum.  The next day, Churchill flew to Paris, where he was again pressed for an extra 10 squadrons.  Churchill was conscious that history might judge Britain poorly if France fell due to a lack of RAF fighter support, and he asked the War Cabinet to send 6 squadrons to France.  The request was met with some horrified reactions and it was eventually decided to use 6 squadrons, based in Britain, working in rotation to provide cover in France.  Thus, 3 squadrons worked a ‘morning’ shift, and 3 different squadrons an ‘afternoon’ shift.

Whilst Churchill was in France, he was to see for himself the completely defeated attitude of the French.  In their view, they had already lost the War.  Indeed, Reynaud had said as much, in a telephone conversation with Churchill, on 15th May.  Churchill had reluctantly, but finally, seen the writing on the wall.  Britain was soon to be on her own.

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