The whole defence system of Fighter Command in 1940 was based on radar. The experiments had been successful. The new device worked. There were some 32 Chain Home radar stations, each involving 350 foot steel lattice masts, side by side, with 250 foot wooden masts. These were complemented by the Chain Home Low stations which had been developed by army scientists to detect aircraft flying at low altitude. On the steel masts were the radar devices sending out the pulse signals which got reflected from incoming aircraft. These reflections were picked up on the apparatus on the wooden masts. In their hut below, Airmen and WAAFs, known as Clerks-Special Duties, watched their cathode ray screens for the tell tale blips generated by incoming aircraft. Each such station was connected by landline, laid specially by the GPO to Bentley Priory. There, the signals came into a filter room designed to weed out false messages. Having got through that, the signal went on to the control room where a set of WAAFs, circulated around a very large scale map of Britain. There, they used the signals to place small blocks of wood representing the aircraft, red for the Germans which they called Bandits and black for ours. Above all this was a platform on which Dowding and his staff could watch the proceedings, as the WAAFs pushed the markers around.
Another important ancillary part of the organisation was played by the Observer Corps. With its 30,000 strong membership, spread amongst the one thousand observer posts dotted around the country, they fed their sightings of aircraft, enemy and friendly, through to their headquarters and from that to Bentley Priory. Each Observer Corps post was equipped with tin hats, apparatus for measuring the height of aircraft, telephones which connected them with the system, and, most important of all, tea making apparatus. The Observer Corps role was to keep track of aircraft over land. Radar only observed over the sea, pointing outward from the coast.
All this information which came into Bentley Priory was disseminated onwards to the four Groups. Each Group had a similar setup with WAAFs pushing markers around a map of their area. Executive responsibility for instituting action was held at Group level. The Group Commander decided which squadrons to send up, in what number, and which should be held in reserve. He actually fought the battle. It was on his skill and judgement that the outcome and confrontation with the enemy would depend. Each Group had its sector stations. These had the controllers who were in direct contact with the squadrons. They remained in touch with them after take off, giving them interception courses to fly which were marked on the Sector plotting tables. This is how Fighter Command was to operate throughout the battle. Its operations were invariably in response to what the radar was showing, which was plotted at HQ Control and then at Group Control. The whole thing worked like a coordinated machine. At the time, the system was absolutely unique, there was nothing else like it. It was to play a vital part in the battle.

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June 28, 2010 at 11:22 am
Airminded · Post-blogging 1940
[...] of Britain Day by Day – 28 June 1940 Duxford Operations Blog – 28 June 1940 Orwell Diaries – 28 June 1940 Spitfire Site [...]
June 29, 2010 at 10:31 am
Paul Handley
A request for more info on this fascinating subject, more than a comment:
How were the radar sites defended? What knowledge did the Nazis have of them, and how and to what extent were they attacked, and with what results?
Regards,
Paul.
July 1, 2010 at 2:41 pm
Tony Rudd
Paul,
Reference to your query concerning the radar sites. You will get more information on the subject as the blog develops along with the battle. But briefly the sites were defended by Fighter Command intercepting German aircraft that attacked them. Of course, occasionally, they managed to get in and out before being attacked by the RAF. The Germans seemed to have very little knowledge of the system. However, we were very good at putting them back into service when they were damaged by attacks. So much so that Goering, half way through the battle, ordered that attacks on them be discontinued as, apparently, they were not being effective.
June 29, 2010 at 11:58 am
Battleofbritaintv
In the words of so many, RDF, or the ‘Dowding System’ was so vital to our success in the Battle of Britain…
http://www.battleofbritain.tv/WAAF.html
I would love to share with you some exerpts from my interview with one of the WAAF’s who worked at the control room of Uxbridge.
”
RDF
RDF was absolutely vital. Aircraft in those days didn’t have a long time to stay up because they ran out of petrol. The RDF ran from the coast outwards and we could monitor the stations in France and Belgium, and we could see when they were taking off. We could see that the fighter Aircraft were in the sky at the right time, but not too soon. They weren’t just hanging about there. They would go up and be there, ready to intercept as soon as the raid got within range. So RDF was absolutely vital. It was the thing that made all the difference.
Command and Control
We got our information from the filter room at Stanmore who got it from the RDF, as it was called then, and from the royal Observer Corps. The Corps haven’t really been talked about very much, but they did a lot because the RDF was round the coast. So what happened as soon as enemy raids crossed the coast, it wasn’t recorded by the RDF, it was recorded by the Royal Observer Corps – People standing on steeples, church towers and things like that – and phoning in!
It all went into Stanmore – the Filter room, to people who were going to operate on it. We received it by headphones, and also by teleprinter tape. There was a teleprinter – a small, square machine, by each plotting station. The tape came out with all the information on:
· First you would see map coordinates
· Next the direction that the aircraft were flying
· Next the number of aircraft
· Then the height
You put that up on the block, but unless it was up to date it was no good. It was useless to know where they were ten minutes ago. You had to know then. That’s why they had this colour system of plots.
The colour altered so that the controller would know how old the lot was. At the end of each run you took the oldest colour off. You swept them all off, put them in a box. So you had to be pretty quick and pretty dextrous.
The thing I’ve often been a bit surprised about was that all the girls on the watch had had a very good education. Everybody had what was the equivalent of O Levels at least. In fact we were locally called ‘The Boarding School Girls’ (which most of us weren’t actually). But I can see now that you couldn’t have done it unless you were pretty bright. You had to be able to work quickly and accurately. ”
Flt Lt Hazel Gregory, Clerk Special-duties, Uxbridge Control Room, 11 Group, May- Dec 1940
Excerpt from interview 11 November 2009
http://www.twitter.com/battleofbritain
July 1, 2010 at 2:24 pm
Spitfire Site
There were also other technology improvements prior to the battle, for example constant-speed propellers to all RAF aircraft:
http://spitfiresite.com/2010/06/battle-of-britain-1940-constant-speed-propellers.html
July 2, 2010 at 8:42 am
JOHN MORRIS BUSH
I helped to maintain the Radar transmitters after the battle. You may be interested to know that there were 3 transmitters on our site, one up and running, one on standby in case of failure, and the other one under maintenance. Each transmitter consisted of two very large modules, in fact the two output valves were the size of a mans torso, and dissasembled for cleaning, the body of the valve was made of china, and there was a pump to extract the air in the valve to give the vacuum needed. It took about an hour get a transmitter up and running, that is why one was on standby ready to have to final steps when the up and running one failed. We had three minutes to get back on air otherwise a report had to be submitted.
July 4, 2010 at 3:08 pm
m b bingham
Am a former plastics technologist and ’52-’55 RAF wireless mechanic. Understand that using newly discovered polyethylene (ICI Polythene) as radar cable insulant gave superior preservation of detection signal than the earlier compounded rubber cable insulant. This increase in insulation props. known as K factor, provided an even earlier enemy aircraft approach warning, which allegedly puzzled the Germans.
I understand that (rather like penycillin’s serendipitious discovery) polythene was discovered by ICI after ethylene had escaped from a high pressure gas cylinder and had become this wax-like polymer around the cylinder’s leaky valve. ICI quickly went on to build a plant making a high pressure, low density version called Polythene.
I was told this story recently by a lady, who’d been in the wartime ICI Polythene lab at Runcorn and is now living in the same sheltered housing block in Cheshire where a D Day veteran pal lives.
July 7, 2010 at 1:46 pm
Tim Pottle
Great stuff! My Grandfather was involved in the initial testing of the Radar system.
Tim
July 12, 2010 at 9:49 am
Tony Rudd
Very interesting. Any chance of anything more on your grandfather whose work must have been very rewarding. Tony Rudd