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Statistical summary, Week 7:
- Total Fighter Command Establishment: 1558 planes
- Strength: 1377 planes
- Balance: understrength 181 planes
- Losses: 20 Hurricanes (+ 1 damaged), 23 Spitfire, 4 Defiants
- Aircraft Production: 5 Beaufighters, 8 Defiants, 64 Hurricanes, 44 Spitfires
Good intelligence relies on the capacity to understand what is going on in the head of the enemy. During the Battle of Britain, the Germans were not good at this. The Germans had a number of intelligence agencies, each of which jealously guarded their own information. This rivalry, coupled with the intelligence officers providing the leadership with the figures that they wanted to hear, meant that German intelligence could be notoriously inaccurate .
On one occasion, the Luftwaffe had convinced itself that in every way it was more effective than any other air force that existed including the RAF. The trouble was that the Luftwaffe completely failed to appreciate the potential advantage which the new control system of defence, based on radar, gave the RAF. This system was after all the very core of the way the British fought the Battle. The underestimation by the Luftwaffe of the importance of radar to the British can be seen from the way that Goering, in the middle of August, countermanded the orders to attack radar installations. This was because, very shortly after being attacked, they were once again transmitting their signals. The explanation for this was that the Germans thought that the workings were buried beneath concrete reinforcements, which was just not the case. Being above ground, once damaged they could be put back together again very quickly.
The teams responsible for repairing bomb damage were extremely efficient. The only concrete reinforcements were to be found at Fighter Command Headquarters at Bentley Priory and at 11 Group where the control room was protected in this way. All the rest of the radar installations were housed in flimsy huts, easily damaged but easily reconstructed. It also seems as though the Luftwaffe had no system for identifying which airfield being attacked actually belonged to Fighter Command. Consequently, they attacked airfields belonging to Coastal and to Training Command. Indeed, the most apparently successful attack by the Luftwaffe during the Battle was when a couple of Ju88s succeeded in destroying over 50 aircraft at Brize Norton airfield. In fact these had been training aircraft. It was a brilliant attack but had no effect on Fighter Command. The result was a continuing overestimation by the Luftwaffe of how, in the light of the rate of destruction, Fighter Command was being damaged. It all contributed to the feeling that they were much nearer achieving the complete elimination of Fighter Command than in reality was the case.
Weather: dull and cloudy.
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours:
- Blenheim – 55
- Spitfire – 228
- Hurricane – 420
- Defiant – 18
- Gladiator – 7
- Total – 728
This day the Luftwaffe flew scattered attacks and also flew a considerable number of photographic reconnaissance flights aimed at establishing what damage had been done during recent days.
It was on this day that Park let his dissatisfaction surface with regard to the lack of cooperation he was getting from the neighbouring group to the north, no 12. In a well distributed signal he contrasted the cooperation his group had been receiving from 10 Group to the west , with what he was getting from 12 Group. On two occasions, he had apparently asked for reinforcements from 12 Group to patrol airfields, including Debden, while its squadrons were fighting further south. The cooperation requested had not materialised and Debden was heavily bombed. Park was getting seriously frustrated. In his signal, he told his controllers that when they needed assistance from 12 Group they should put their request through Command at Bentley Priory. It was the start of a dispute which was to escalate into a full scale row. To start with the AOC of 12 Group, Leigh Mallory disliked Dowding and had told Park about it. He thought he should have got Park’s job when the latter had been selected as the new AOC of 11 Group. It was clearly a plum job and he thought he should have got the plum. Finally, he was jealous of the opportunity that Park had been given. 11 Group was clearly the frontline of the Battle. He resented the primacy given to Park as a result.
Furthermore, there was another problem hatching in those weeks. Douglas Bader, the famous legless pilot, was, in his way, similarly put out by the prominence being given to 11 Group pilots. Moreover, Bader had his own idea of how the battle should be fought. The airmen he modelled himself on were the aces of the First World War, men like Ball and McCudden who had taken the lead in the battles they had fought. But here he was being asked to play second fiddle to 11 Group squadrons and being ordered about the sky by disembodied voices. What he wanted to do was to meet the enemy with superior force. This meant forming a wing of several squadrons, three or even five, led, of course, by him. Park was to find this suggestion impractical. There was too little time to assemble such a force given the imminent attacks from which 11 Group squadrons were suffering. All this was to build up ahead of steam over the next few weeks.
That day, 27th August, was to be one of the last in which Luftflotte 3 was to participate. Their part in the day time battle was shortly to end. Their role then became the leader of the night time campaign by the Luftwaffe which followed the day time Battle of Britain.
54 Squadron Operational Record Book – 27 August
A day of rest. Our new squadron leader – of international fame – S/L Donald Finlay, arrived at Hornchurch.
74 Squadron Operational Record Book – 27 August, Kirton Lindsey
Mr Mansbridge RA who has been appointed by the Air Ministry to paint portraits of famous fighter pilots arrived and painted portrait of S/L Malan DFC (bar).
Reported Casualties (RAF Campaign Diary 27th August 1940):
* Enemy: 4 confirmed, 1 probable, 1 damaged
* Own: 1 aircraft
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